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Introduction
& Overview to Georgia Property Taxes
By
Charles R. Beaudrot, Esquire
Morris, Manning & Martin, LLP
crb@mmmlaw.com
404.504.7753
I.
The Constitutional and Statutory Basis.
Property
taxes, generally referred to as ad valorem taxes, are the oldest
source of revenue used by the State of Georgia and its political
subdivisions. The origins of ad valorem taxation can be traced at
least as far back as Medieval England with the imposition of feudal
fees or levies as a condition on the privilege of continued use
or enjoyment of an owner's land (fee). Indeed, the very term used
in Georgia to describe such taxes harks back to this origin. The
utilization of the Latin phrase "ad valorem" to describe
this kind of tax refers to a tax based "upon the value"
of the interest held by the taxpayer.
Whether
the interest in the property is real or personal is not dispositive
-- rather it is the value of the interest which triggers the liability
for the tax. See for example Wells v. Mayor of Savannah, 87 Ga.
App. 397, 13 S.E. 442 (1897) [Land purchased from the city on condition
of a perpetual ground rent or, alternatively, upon payment of the
stated purchase price was currently taxable to the tenant/"owner"
even though rents were reserved payable to the City and such rents
might affect the tax by reducing the value of the property.] Property
taxes have been, and continue to be, a mainstay of the economic
viability of local governments.
A.
Constitutional Authority.
The
constitutional authority to tax property is founded in the Georgia
Constitution Art. VII, §1, ¶3. This section provides that all such
taxes must be levied and collected under general laws and for public
purpose only and must be uniform within the same class within the
applicable jurisdiction.
"All
taxes shall be levied and collected under general laws and
for public purposes only. Except as otherwise provided in
subparagraphs (c), (d), and (e), all taxation shall be uniform
upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits
of the authority levying the tax. . . ."
B.
Scope of Tax.
In
general, all tangible property (both real and personal) is subject
to tax unless it is exempted. Thus, O.C.G.A. §48-5-3 provides
"All
real property including, but not limited to, leaseholds,
interests less than fee, and all personal property shall
be liable to taxation and shall be taxed, except as otherwise
provided by law. Liability of property for taxation shall
not be affected by the individual or corporate character
of the property owner or by the resident or nonresident
status of the property owner."
This
general rule is unaffected by character of the property owner or
the resident or non-resident status of an owner. Thus, for example,
an attorney's law library is taxable. Clayton County Board of Tax
Assessors v. King, 260 Ga. 495, 397 S.E.2d 293 (1990)
C.
Requirement of Uniformity.
As
Chief Justice Marshall remarked so long ago, "That the power
to tax involves the power to destroy . . . [is
a] proposition not be denied". McCullouch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
316 (1819). Because of the intensely local, and often highly political,
nature of property taxes, the constitutional requirement of uniformity
of taxation is of great importance to protect against wanton exercise
of that power. This uniformity requirement is the vehicle that protects
the property owner from arbitrarily being singled out. The theory,
of course, is that the political process will protect the taxpayer/property
owner from arbitrary and discriminatory taxes. T.W. Colvard v. Ridley,
218 Ga. 490, 128 S.E.2d 732 (1962); Lott Investment Corp. v. City
of Waycross, 218 Ga. 805, 130 S.E.2d 741 (1963). The constitutional
requirement of uniformity is so compelling that it even outweighs
the statutory mandate of taxation at fair market value. McLennon
v. Undercofler, 222 Ga. 302, 149 S.E.2d 705 (1966).
To
ensure administratively that equalization of valuation of property
on taxation is maintained, it is monitored now by requirements of
uniformity of assessment. These are now enforced by O.C.G.A. §48-5-341
et seq. These sections require the Revenue Commissioner to review
and approve (or reject) tax digests as prepared by the local taxing
authorities. If defective, the Commissioner is obligated to withhold
substantial grants from the local government as well as to impose
penalties under O.C.G.A. §48-5-346.
In
the presentations today, you will see several times how ad valorem
taxation is an unusual tax in part because of its unusual administrative
structure. Although the laws creating the tax and specifying the
operative rules are state laws, the determination of the rate of
taxation (the millage rate) and administration of the tax is a matter
of local administration and local budgets.
II.
Federal Constitutional Limitations.
A.
Interstate Commerce.
The
taxation of property by Georgia and the other states is subject
to federal constitutional limitations on the ability of the states
to impose such taxes. These limitations are perhaps most telling
in the context of limitations imposed by the Federal Commerce Clause
on taxation of movable property. The leading case in this area,
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Grady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) although
a sales tax case, indicates that the states have considerable latitude
as to nondiscriminatory application of ad valorem taxation to property
used in interstate commerce. The concept that movable property used
in interstate commerce can be subject to ad valorem taxation and
can be taxed in the state where regularly and habitually employed
has long been recognized. Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U.S.
275 (1919).
Under
the Georgia Code, railroad equipment owned by a railroad company
and aircraft equipment owned by an airline company are taxed on
a special basis. The ad valorem tax on railroad equipment is prorated
based on car-wheel mileage. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-519. Airplanes
are similarly taxed on a ratio of "plane hours" within
and without Georgia. O.C.G.A. §§ 48-5-540 through 48-5-546.
Apparently
some form of apportionment is constitutionally mandated for property
used in interstate commerce. East West Express, Inc. v. Collins,
264 Ga. 774, 449 S.E.2d 599. Thus, ad valorem taxes on motor vehicles
used in interstate commerce may be apportioned by demonstrating
to the local taxing authority that the vehicles have acquired tax
situs in other states. Although not specifically authorized by statute,
apportionment is not prohibited. Therefore, lack of apportionment
under statutes regarding ad valorem taxation of motor vehicles and
mobile homes does not make these statutes unconstitutional. O.C.G.A.
§§ 48-5-442 through 48-5-445, § 48-5-471.
B.
Foreign Commerce.
Similarly,
the Foreign Commerce Clause also imposes some limitations on the
authority of the states to tax property in foreign commerce. Generally,
the issue is whether the goods in question are still in the chain
of international commerce. Thus, for instance, in Michelin Tire
Corporation v. Wages, Tax Commissioner, et al., 423 U.S. 276 (1976),
the Supreme Court upheld Georgia's imposition of a nondiscriminatory
property tax on imported goods, so long as these were no longer
"in transit".
By
statute, Georgia has provided for some liberality in this regard,
at least with respect to foreign property imported through a Georgia
port. Thus, O.C.G.A. §48-5-5 provides
"Foreign
merchandise in transit shall acquire no situs so as to become
subject to ad valorem taxation by political subdivisions
of this state in which the port of original entry or the
port of export of such merchandise is located. Such property
shall not acquire situs by virtue of the fact that while
in the warehouse the property is assembled, bound, joined,
processed, disassembled, divided, cut, broken in bulk, relabeled,
or repackaged. The grant of "no situs" status
shall be liberally construed to effect the purposes of this
Code section."
The
liberality of this rule should not be overestimated however. See
e.g. Seaboard Corp. v. Chatham County Board of Equalization, 195
Ga. App. 730, 394 S.E. 2d 796 (1990) [Imported stone tile and slabs
which were stored at the taxpayer's convenience for sale to anyone
who might wish to purchase them are not in transit to a final destination
within the contemplation of this section so as to meet the definition
of foreign merchandise in transit]; Los Angeles Tile Company v.
Chatham County Board of Tax Assessors, 209 Ga. App. 245, 433 S.E.2d
82 (1993) [Ceramic tile imported from Japan stored in a warehouse
in Chatham County which has no specific identified destination is
taxable]; Pier 1 Imports v. Chatham Board of Tax Assessors 199 Ga.
App. 294, 404 S.E.2d 637 (1991) [Property imported through Charleston,
South Carolina but transported to Savannah and stored there, did
not qualify for the exemption because the Port of Charleston was
not within the State of Georgia]. See also "Freeport Exemption
from Property Taxes for Inventory Stored in Georgia But Destined
for Shipment Out-of-State", 28 Ga. St. B.J. 108 (1991).
C.
Equal Protection and Due Process.
Finally,
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution requires that similar taxpayers be treated similarly.
However, as the recent case of Nordlinger v. Hahn, U.S. , 113 S.Ct.
2326 (1992) sustaining California's Proposition 13 "welcome
stranger" provision indicates, the states have considerable
freedom to draw the lines in the ad valorem area without infringing
upon these limitations.
III.
Classifications.
As
discussed above, the Legislature is authorized to provide for the
assessment and taxation of various classes of property. Currently
these consist of the following:
-
Trailers (Georgia Constitution, Art. 7 §1 ¶3(b)(2)(A));
-
Mobile homes, other than mobile homes which qualify for homestead
exemption for ad valorem taxation (Georgia Constitution, Art.
7 §1 ¶3(b)(2)(B));
-
Heavy duty equipment owned by non-residents (Georgia Constitution
Art. 7 §1 ¶3(b)(2)(C));
-
tangible real property, but not more than 2,000 acres for a
single property owner, which is devoted to bona fide agricultural
purposes; (Georgia Constitution, Art. 7 §1 ¶3(c));
-
public utilities; (Georgia Constitution, Art. 7 §1 ¶3(f))
-
tangible real property which is listed on the national registry
of historical places or a state historic register; (Georgia
Constitution, Art. 7 §1 ¶3(d)); and
-
"bona fide conservation use" and "bona fide residential
transitional property" according to a formula based on
current use, annual activity and real property sales data to
encourage the preservation, conservation or protection of such
property. (Georgia Constitution, Art. 7 §1 ¶3(e)). Conservation
use of property for these purposes includes agricultural and
timber land that does not exceed 2,000 acres per single owner.
Residential transitional property includes private single family
residential owner occupied property located in transitional
development areas not to exceed 5 acres of any single owner.
Although
uniformity is mandated as among the respective classifications,
within the classifications, assessments and valuation methodologies
may vary. Generally, under O.C.G.A. §48-5-7 the assessment is imposed
at a rate of 40% of the fair market value according to the property's
fair market value. O.C.G.A. §48-5-7(a). However, as we shall see,
"fair market value" does not have the same meaning for
all classes of property.
Equally
important, the assessment base for the various classes of property
varies. Thus, for instance, agricultural property within the meaning
of §48-5-7(b) is assessed for ad valorem property tax purposes at
75% of the value which other tangible real property is assessed.
As
to historic property under O.C.G.A. §48-5-7(c) and (c)(i), the definition
of fair market value is a modified definition, discussed below,
which appears in O.C.G.A. §48-5-2. Finally, under §48-5-7(c.2) and
(c.3) relating to bona fide conservation use and bona fide residential
use transitional property, the valuation is tied to current use
value, rather than the property's fair market value. The current
use value definition is contained at O.C.G.A. §48-5-2(1) and (2).
IV.
Fair Market Value.
As
noted at the outset of this outline, the term ad valorem taxation
derives from the concept of taxation based on fair market value.
However, matters of taxation are seldom as simple as they seem.
Ad valorem taxation is no exception.
For
starters, the concept of "fair market value" which is
contained in §48-5-2(3) contains some inherent internal contradictions.
The definition is of such significance as to merit recapitulation
here.
- "(3)
'Fair market value of property' means the amount a knowledgeable
buyer would pay for the property and a willing seller would
accept for the property at an arm's length, bona fide sale.
With respect to the valuation of equipment, machinery, and
fixtures when no ready market exists for the sale of the
equipment, machinery, and fixtures, fair market value may
be determined by resorting to any reasonable, relevant,
and useful information available including, but not limited
to, the original cost of the property, any depreciation
or obsolescence, and any increase in value by reason of
inflation. Each tax assessor shall have access to any public
records of the taxpayer for the purpose of discovering such
information.
- (A)
In determining the fair market value of a going business
where its continued operation is reasonably anticipated,
the tax assessor may value the equipment, machinery,
and fixtures which are the property of the business
as a whole where appropriate to reflect the accurate
fair market value.
- (B)
The tax assessor shall consider the following criteria
in determining the fair market value of real property:
- (i)
Existing zoning of property;
- (ii)
Existing use of property, including any restrictions
or limitations on the use of property resulting from
state or federal law or rules or regulations adopted
pursuant to the authority of state or federal law;
- (iii)
Existing covenants or restrictions in deed dedicating
the property to a particular use; and
- (iv)
Any other factors deemed pertinent in arriving at
fair market value."
The
inherent schizophrenia is important. The opening paragraph clearly
states the classic formulation of the concept of fair market value
-- i.e. the concept of what a willing buyer would pay and a willing
seller would sell in an arms length bona fide sale. However, subparagraph
3(B)(ii) contains a concept which is at odds with the classic definition
of fair market value as it appears to contradict the notion of highest
and best use. Indeed, the role of "highest and best use"
is clearly limited for ad valorem tax purposes in Georgia. See Dotson
v. Henry County Board of Tax Assessors, 155 Ga. App. 557, 271 S.E.2d
691 (1980). Finally, the statute specifically contemplates the utilization
of original cost valuation with an allowance for depreciation or
obsolescence as well as inflation as a permissible methodology for
tangible personal property.
V.
Special Problems in Ad Valorem Taxation.
A.
Taxation of Usufructs and other Interests in Real Property.
Georgia
is unique among the American common law jurisdictions in that it
recognizes an estate or interest with respect to the utilization
of land referred to as a usufruct. A usufruct is a mere license
to use or enjoy the use of property without conveyance of an interest
in the land. It is to be distinguished from a leasehold estate or
an estate for years which is an interest in land. In the world of
legal niceties and distinctions, a usufruct is a mere right to use
property, not an interest in that property. O.C.G.A. §44-7-1.
Over
the years there has been repeated and extensive litigation, largely
growing out of the utilization of various facilities at Hartsfield
International Airport, in which the airlines have, generally successfully,
contended that contractual arrangements for 30, 35 and 40 years
under various lease agreements to do not give rise to leasehold
estate but, instead, to a mere usufruct. Under these circumstances,
the airlines' interests in the subject estate cannot be taxed as
it does not rise to a level of taxable "property". This
is true even though the value of such concessions may in fact be
quite significant. Not surprisingly, the revenue authorities, generally
in Clayton County, have been quick to challenge every "lease"
negotiated by one of the major airlines as giving rise to a taxable
leasehold estate instead of a usufruct interest. For examples, see
Camp v. Delta Airlines, Inc. 232 Ga. 37, 205 S.E.2d 194 (1974);
Clayton County Board of Tax Assessors v. City of Atlanta 164 Ga.
App. 864, 298 S.E.2d 544 (1982).
The
issue of usufruct versus estate for years can also arise as to purely
private litigants. Here, however, the issue is not only whether
the tenant's interest is separately taxable as a leasehold estate,
but rather whether the landlord's retained interest as landlord
is taxable. Again, the courts generally find what most of us think
to be "leases" to create non-taxable "usufructs".
See e.g. Searcy v. Peach County Board of Tax Assessors, 180 Ga.
App. 531, 349 S.E. 2d 515 (1986). Similarly, an instrument which
uses the terminology of "lease" may be subject to characterization
as a non-taxable security interest. United States v. DeKalb County,
729 F.2d 738 (11th Cir. 1984).
On
the other hand, in the case of a life estate, the life tenant is
liable for the taxes on the property. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-9.
B.
Taxation of Computer Software.
As
the American economy has continued to evolve from an economy principally
devoted to manufacturing to today's service economy, issues have
emerged that were not anticipated by the drafters of the existing
ad valorem tax regime. Specifically, an issue of continuing interest
and concern for the high tech industry in Georgia has been the taxation
of computer software for ad valorem tax purposes.
Administratively,
certain Georgia taxpayers have been assessed with respect to the
book value of the capitalized costs of their software. Certain assessors
in certain counties took the position that capitalized software
is tangible personal property and is therefore subject to tax under
the personal property assessment procedures to be discussed today.
Whether
software was taxable as "tangible personal property" for
ad valorem tax purposes was highly debatable. Historically for instance,
the Revenue Department itself has drawn a distinction between a
so-called "custom" or "canned or prewritten software"
for purposes of whether such assets constitute tangible personal
property for sales tax purposes. The Revenue Department's current
position is that "canned" or "prewritten" software
is taxable for sales tax purposes, but that "custom" software
is not. What is "custom" as opposed to "canned"
is less than clear.
More
generally, there was a fundamental question as to why software would
not be properly categorized as an intangible. Specifically, pursuant
to O.C.G.A. §48-6-21(9) even as it existed prior to amendment described
below, intangible personal property included a category of property
including "patents, copyrights, franchises, and all other classes
and kinds of intangible personal property not otherwise enumerated."
There was no Georgia case law or interpretation with respect to
whether the concept of intangible property should include software.
It did not take a vast extension of existing case law to argue that
the physical embodiment of software in a tangible form, such as
in a diskette, should make the underlying software no more taxable
as tangible personal property than embodiment of the words of Gone
With the Wind in the covers of the book or in the form of a videotape
makes the copyright of Gone With the Wind taxable as tangible personal
property. Cf. Turner Communications Corporation v. Chilivis, 239
Ga. 91, 236 S.E.2d. 251 (1971). [Videotapes are tangible personal
property for sales tax purposes even though they consist of a least
three different components: tangible medium, intangible contents,
and limited right to use the encoded program.]
The
Revenue Department had indicated, at least informally, that custom
computer software should constitute intangibles and not be subject
to the ad valorem regime. However, the Revenue Department also had
indicated that the county administrative offices were free to examine
the issue and would not preclude their efforts to assess taxpayers.
Some
commentators had urged that the line could be drawn between software
inventoried physically in diskettes for sale, which would be subject
to taxation based upon the rules applicable to inventory, versus
the intangible residual inherent in the software as intellectual
property. See Beaudrot, "Current Issues in State Taxation of
Computer Software -- The Georgia Experience" The Atlanta Lawyer,
Volume 40, No. 1 (1993).
The
high tech industry in Georgia made a top priority for the 1993 legislative
session an effort to obtain relief in this area. In this, the industry
was most fortunate to enlist the support of Governor Miller. The
result, H.B. 350, which is codified in O.C.G.A. §48-1-8 and amendments
to O.C.G.A. §48-6-21 represents an interesting grafting of several
concepts. First, computer software is defined in O.C.G.A. §48-1-8(a)
for the first time.
- (a)
As used in this Code section, the term "computer software"
means any program or routine, or any set of one or more
programs or routines, which are used or intended for use
to cause one or more computers or pieces of computer related
peripheral equipment, or any combination thereof, to perform
a task or set of tasks. Without limiting the generality
of the foregoing, the term "computer software"
shall include operating and application programs and all
related documentation.
Second, computer
software is defined to constitute personal property for ad valorem
and intangible tax purposes only to the extent of the medium which
stored.
-
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) of this Code
section, for the purposes of Chapters 5 and 6 of this title,
computer software shall constitute personal property only
to the extent of the value of the unmounted or uninstalled
medium on or in which it is stored or transmitted.
Finally, amendments to O.C.G.A. §48-6-21 classify computer software as an intangible, thus removing it from the domain of the county tax assessors.
The
net result is that software is valued only to the extent of the
medium and is taxed as an intangible. This "double whammy"
means that in most cases, little or no tax will ever be due with
respect to software.
One
of the most interesting aspects of O.C.G.A. §48-1-8(c) is the "inventory"
exception to this rule.
- (c)
Nothing herein shall be deemed to affect the taxation under
Chapter 5 or Chapter 8 of this title of copies of computer
software held as inventory in a tangible medium ready for
sale at retail by one who is a dealer with respect to such
property and the sale of which is subject to sales and use
taxation.
Thus, such inventory
is subject to normal rules. This section also has interesting implications,
particularly in the context of the Georgia Sales and Use Tax.
C.
Taxation of Personal Property.
Taxation
of tangible personal property raises its own host of issues. Some
of the most difficult arise from issues involving the multi-county
assessment procedure and the correlative requirement that all property
be assigned a situs for purposes of assessment of ad valorem tax.
As
a general rule, real property is taxed and returned to the tax commissioner
or tax receiver in the county where the property is located. Personal
property, however, is taxed under a rather more complex regime.
Initially,
bear in mind that under O.C.G.A. §48-5-42
"All
personal clothing and effects, household furniture, furnishings,
equipment, appliances, and other personal property used
within the home, if not held for sale, rental, or other
commercial use, shall be exempt from all ad valorem taxation.
All tools and implements of trade of manual laborers and
all domestic animals shall be exempted from all ad valorem
taxation in an amount not to exceed $300.00 in actual value
for each of the two categories."
Thus, personal
household effects are exempt from ad valorem taxation.
If
the owner is a Georgia resident individual, the personal property
is taxed in the county where the owner maintains his personal domicile.
It is for this reason that one's automobile is properly subject
to taxation in Fulton County, not in Glynn County, where one has
one's vacation home, even if the vehicle is maintained year round
at Sea Island. O.C.G.A. §48-5-444. Vehicles of non-residents
on the other hand are taxable where situated. Id.
Effective
July 1, 1993 this result changed for boats. These are now assessed
and taxable where "functionally located," i.e., docked.
O.C.G.A. §48-5-16(d). And effective January 1, 1995 aircraft are
taxed where the aircraft has its "primary home base" unless
it has none, in which case situs follows the owner's permanent legal
residence. Mobile homes, not surprisingly, are also taxed in the
county where located, unless associated with a regular business
enterprise. O.C.G.A. §48-5-444.
Under
O.C.G.A. §48-5-12 personal property of non-residents of Georgia
is taxed where the property is located.
"Unless
otherwise provided by law, all real and personal property
of nonresidents shall be returned for taxation to the tax
commissioner or tax receiver of the county where the property
is located."
Finally,
under O.C.G.A. §48-5-16 business tangible personal property is taxed
in the county where the business is located.
Return
of tangible personal property in county where business conducted.
(a)
Any person who conducts a business enterprise upon real
property, which is not taxable in the county in which the
person resides or in which the person's office is located,
shall return for taxation the tangible personal property
of the business enterprise to the tax commissioner or tax
receiver of the county in which is taxable the real property
upon which the business enterprise is located or conducted.
(b)
When the agent in this state of any person who is a resident
of another state has on hand and for sale, storage, or otherwise
merchandise or other tangible property, he shall return
the property for taxation as provided in Code Section 48-5-12.
. . ."
A
special set of rules applies to public utilities and certain other
companies which is outside the scope of today's discussion.
The
kinds of problems that this regime can present are well illustrated
by the case of Collins v. Mills 198 Ga. 18, 30 S.E.2d 866 (1944).
In that case, lumber had been cut, sold and stocked in various counties
using portable saw mills. The lumber was held assessable to the
owner of the lumber in the county of the owner's residence, not
the county in which the lumber was physically located. In order
to achieve the result of taxability in the county in which located,
the court indicated that the property would have had to have acquired
a situs for taxation in that other county by being connected with
a business enterprise that was situated more or less permanently
in such county. Merely transitory or temporary locations do not
generate such situs. Contrast Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Company v.
Evans, 214 Ga. 1, 102 S.E. 2d 547 (1958) where the several coke
vending machines were held taxable in each separate county. See
also Cornett Bridge, Inc. v. Hall County (Ga. Ct. of App. Feb. 23,
1995, Case No. A94A2231) [Headquarters of construction company located
in Hall County, but construction equipment stored in Banks County.
The court concluded that Banks County was a separate place of business
for these purposes, but remanded for trial as to whether the equipment
was connected with headquarters in Hall County or the construction
yard in Banks County.]
The
fact that the tax liability arises on January 1 of each year also
raises some pragmatic issues from a liability point of view. On
a pragmatic side, the property which is in transit on the first
of the year is not taxable until it comes to rest in Georgia. Thus,
no matter how many vehicles and new mobile homes are in transit
but not actually delivered and taken into inventory on the first
work day of each year, these are not taxable. See O.C.G.A. §§48-5-472
and 48-5-491. A different rule applies by virtue of O.C.G.A. §48-5-500
and §48-5-501 to certain heavy duty equipment used for construction
owned by non-residents brought into this state after January 1 from
states which tax equipment brought into such states by non-residents
after January 1. Such taxes are prorated based upon the number of
months remaining in the year.
D.
Successor Liability.
The
nature of the liability for ad valorem taxes is also significant.
Although we generally think of the property taxes as being in rem,
i.e. as a tax on the property, in fact the owner of the property
is personally liable for the taxes. O.C.G.A. §48-5-9. It is the
remedy, however, of sale of the property by tax execution which
is so frequently used that causes taxpayers often to lose sight
of the personal liability issue.
Equally
important, because the assessment matures on January 1 of each year,
the resulting liability follows the property into the hands of the
successor in interest, even with respect to the prior mortgage interest.
See for example Teachers Retirement System of Georgia et al. v.
City of Atlanta, Georgia et al. 241 Ga. 196, 288 S.E. 2d 200 (1982)
in which the court held that even though the Retirement System was
administered by a public corporation, it was held liable for ad
valorem taxes assessed on January 1 of 1975 when the corporation
acquired the property by foreclosure on April 8, 1975. The taxes
attached to the property on January 1 and the public corporation
acquired such property subject to such liability.
VI.
Conclusion.
In
summary, the ad valorem tax regime, though an old and settled body
of law, continues to evolve and change as it confronts issues not
foreseen by its creators. During the remainder of today's session,
we will see in more detail current issues of interest as well as
reviewing in detail the major procedures for taxpayers to protect
their interests.
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