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Partition and Quiet Title Actions in Georgia


Lewis E. Hassett
Morris, Manning & Martin, LLP
leh@mmmlaw.com


1. Partition.

Georgia law recognizes two types of partition actions, equitable partition and statutory partition. This section discusses each type, as well as the comparative advantages of each.

a. Equitable Partition.

In an equitable partition action, the court decides how to partition property physically. See Gifford v. Courson, 224 Ga. 840, 165 S.E.2d 133 (1968). If the court decides that a physical partition is impracticable, the court may order the property sold and the proceeds divided. Id.

Equitable partition has the advantage of simplicity. Not only is the convoluted procedure of statutory partition avoided, but the familiar rules of the Civil Practice Act govern. See generally Sikes v. Sikes, 233 Ga. 97, 209 S.E.2d 641 (1974). Additionally, because partition actions generally are part of other disputes, the equitable partition procedure allows all issues to be decided in one proceeding. Gorman v. Gorman, 239 Ga. 312, 236 S.E.2d 652 (1977). For example, it is not unusual for two parties to dispute the title of the other but to request, alternatively, that property be partitioned if the court finds that they are tenants in common.

Equitable partition is available only in the absence of an adequate remedy of law or upon a showing that circumstances make equitable relief more just and suitable. O.C.G.A. § 44-6-140; Larimer v. Larimer, 249 Ga. 500, 292 S.E.2d 71 (1982). The Georgia Supreme Court has strictly applied this concept to deny equitable partition where statutory partition is available. See Burnham v. Lynn, 235 Ga. 207, 219 S.E.2d 111 (1975). Generally, equitable partition will be allowed only when presented as an integral part of other equitable claims.


b. Statutory Partition.

In a statutory partition action, a common owner of land petitions to the superior court for a writ of partition in accordance with a detailed statutory procedure. O.C.G.A. §§ 44-6-160 to 174. The statutory procedure must be utilized, unless the remedy is held inadequate. See Burnham v. Lynn. Though much more structured than an equity proceeding, the statutory proceeding can result in fair relief as this statutory process provides for three possible remedies depending upon the circumstances and desires of the parties.

Before seeking partition under the statute, the petitioner must give at least twenty (20) days notice (no formal process required) to the other parties concerned that a petition for partition is being submitted. O.C.G.A. § 44-6-162. Upon receiving the petition, the court can offer relief in the form of an actual physical partition by issuing a writ for petition and then appointing five partitioners who, after giving all parties eight (8) days notice, shall partition the land in a just and equal manner. O.C.G.A. §§ 44-6-163, 164. After the partition has been returned to the court, any party with an interest in the land may raise an objection to the partition. O.C.G.A. § 44-6-165. If no objections are raised, then the partition is final. If an objection is raised, the matter is referred to a jury. Id.

The statute also provides two means of partition when the physical division of the land is not practical. See O.C.G.A. §§ 44-6-166.1, 167. After a petition has been filed, a party (other than the petitioner) may convince the court that the property cannot be practically divided. If the court agrees, the court appoints three appraisers to value the property. O.C.G.A. § 44-6-166.1. Each owner may choose whether to accept the appraised value of his or her interest or to pay the other owner(s) for the appraised values of their interests. If none of the owners elect to sell his or her interest for the appraised value, then the action is dismissed. If none of the owners elects to buy, then the property will be sold at public sale with the proceeds divided. Id.; See Stone v. Benton, 258 Ga. 539, 371 S.E.2d 864 (1988).


2. Quiet Title Actions.

As is the case with respect to partition, Georgia recognizes an action in equity to quiet title, as well as a separate statutory proceeding. This section discusses both procedures to quiet title, as well as the comparative advantages of each.

a. Equitable Quiet Title.

In an equitable quiet title action, a court may cause to be delivered up and cancel any instrument which casts a cloud over the complainant’s title. O.C.G.A. § 23-3-40; Duffee v. Jones, 208 Ga. 639, 68 S.E.2d 699 (1952). This action is commonly known as a conventional proceeding quia timet. A cloud is an instrument that may give a claimant an apparent right to the property of the current possessor, such as an invalid deed or an obscured boundary line. O.C.G.A. § 23-3-42.

When an action is brought challenging an identified cloud, the court determines the validity of the outstanding claim and issues a decree. The relief sought will be granted where the invalidity of the specific instrument sought to be canceled appears on its face or is revealed through outside facts. O.C.G.A. § 23-3-41. In granting the relief, the court may cancel instruments, construe them to avoid conflicts, grant injunctions, or use other available equitable power. See 25 Encyclopedia of Georgia Law, Quieting Title, § 3 (1986 Rev.). This malleability of remedies is an advantage not found in the statutory proceeding.

Generally, a party must be in possession of the property in order to assert an equitable claim to quiet title. Smith v. Georgia Kaolin Co., Inc., 264 Ga. 755, 449 S.E.2d 85 (1994). In addition, a party must assert either current record title or current prescriptive title. In re Rivermist Homeowners Ass’n Inc., 244 Ga. 515, 260 S.E.2d 897 (1979). However, there are some exceptions to this possession requirement such as when dealing with wild and unoccupied lands or in cases where there is another distinct head of equity jurisdiction sufficient to support the action. Vaughn v. Vaughn, 253 Ga. 76, 317 S.E.2d 201 (1984).


b. Statutory Quiet Title.

By means of a statutory quiet title action, the legislature has provided an "efficient, speedy and effective way to adjudicate disputed title claims." Cowron & Co. v. Shehadeh, 268 Ga. 383, 490 S.E.2d 82 (1997); O.C.G.A. §§ 23-3-60 to 72. Such a proceeding is often referred to as a proceeding quia timet against all the world. Unlike an equitable quiet title action, the statutory proceeding is brought against the property and all the world, thus, eliminating the difficulty of determining the identity or residence of all the possible claims. Smith v. Georgia Kaolin Co., Inc., 264 Ga. 755, 449 S.E.2d 85 (1994).

Any party who claims an interest in the property may bring an action regardless of the fact that the party is not currently in possession. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 23-3-61. However, a party must assert a claim of current record title or current prescriptive title as in an equity action. Smith v. Georgia Kaolin Co., Inc., 264 Ga. 755, 449 S.E.2d 85 (1994).

Upon receipt of the verified petition and property plat, the court submits the information to an appointed special master who provides notice to interested parties and determines the validity of the claims. O.C.G.A. §§ 23-3-64, 65. Any party to the proceeding may demand a jury trial instead of a special master’s determination. O.C.G.A. § 23-3-65. The court issues a decree based upon the findings of the special master or jury that quiets title and binds all parties known or unknown. O.C.G.A. § 23-3-67.

The statutory proceeding has the clear advantage over the equitable action due to the breadth of the court’s decree. Owners, either currently in possession or not, do not have to join the specific individuals that may have outstanding claims to the property, as all outstanding claims are presumed adjudicated. However, failure to follow the specific requirements of the statute can be a bar to relief. Piedmont Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Woelper, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 272 (February 23, 1998)


 

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